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Abstract—The Spectre vulnerability in modern processors has
been widely reported. The key insight in this vulnerability is
that speculative execution in processors can be misused to access
secrets speculatively. Subsequently even though the speculatively
executed instructions are squashed, the secret may linger in
micro-architectural states such as cache, and can potentially be
accessed by an attacker via side channels. We propose oo7, a
static analysis approach that can mitigate Spectre attacks by
detecting potentially vulnerable code snippets in program bina-
ries and protecting them against the attack. We employ control
flow extraction, taint analysis and address analysis to detect
tainted conditional branches and speculative memory accesses.
oo7 can detect all fifteen purpose-built Spectre-vulnerable code
patterns [1], whereas Microsoft compiler with Spectre mitigation
option can only detect two of them. We also report the results
of a large-scale study on applying oo7 to over 500 program
binaries (average binary size 261 KB) from different real-world
projects. We protect programs against Spectre attack by selec-
tively inserting fences only at vulnerable conditional branches to
prevent speculative execution. Our approach is experimentally
observed to incur around 4% performance overheads on SPECint
2006 benchmarks. Finally, we demonstrate that our approach is
flexible and can be tuned to detect many other emerging Spectre
variants, as well as Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Spectre [2] vulnerabilities in processors were revealed
in early 2018. The attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities
can potentially affect almost all modern processors irrespective
of the vendor (Intel, AMD, ARM) and the computer system
(desktop, laptop, mobile) as long as the processor performs
speculative execution. Speculative execution [3] is an indis-
pensable micro-architectural optimizations for performance
enhancement, ubiquitous in almost all modern processors
except for the simplest micro-controllers. It is an aggressive
optimization where the instructions are executed speculatively,
but the temporary results created by the speculatively exe-
cuted instructions execution are maintained in internal micro-
architectural states that cannot be accessed by software. The
results are committed to the programmer-visible architectural
states (registers and memory) only when the speculation is
found to be correct; otherwise, the internal micro-architectural
states are flushed. The most common example is that of the
conditional branches being predicted in hardware and the
instructions along the predicted branch path are executed spec-
ulatively. Once the conditional branch direction is resolved, the
instructions along the speculative path are squashed in case of
wrong prediction.
Spectre attacks exploit speculation to deliberately target the
execution of certain “transient” instructions. These transient
instructions are speculatively executed, and are tricked to bring
in secret data into the cache. These transient instructions are
subsequently squashed but the secret remains, for example,
in the cache. The attacker then carefully accesses the secret
content (that is supposed to be hidden to the outside world)
through different micro-architectural covert channels, for ex-
ample, cache side-channel [4]. The website [5] of Spectre
states that “As [Spectre] is not easy to fix, it will haunt us
for a long time.”
We focus on identifying program binaries that are vulnerable
to Spectre attack and patch those binaries with minimal
performance overhead as a mitigation technique. We present
a comprehensive and scalable solution, called oo7, based on
static program analysis. Our solution employs control flow
extraction, taint analysis and address analysis at the binary
level. Moreover, the analysis needs to model the transient
instructions along the speculative path that has never been
required in traditional program analysis dealing with only pro-
grammer visible execution. We have successfully introduced
accurate modeling of speculative execution in oo7.
Once vulnerable code snippets are detected by oo7, we
introduce fence instructions at selected program points to pre-
vent speculative execution and thereby protect the code from
Spectre attack. We have validated the functional correctness
of our protection mechanism with the fifteen litmus test codes
from [1] on Intel Xeon platform. We note that the current
Spectre mitigation approach introduced by Microsoft C/C++
compiler [6], detects and protects only 2 out of 15 litmus
tests for Spectre vulnerabilities [1], whereas oo7 can detect all
fifteen purpose-built Spectre-vulnerable code patterns. We can
launch successful Spectre attack to access arbitrary locations
in the victim code prior to the insertion of fence insertions
by oo7; but our attempts at Spectre attacks fail after oo7-
directed automated identification and patching of the victim
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code. We experimentally measure the performance overheads
from our selective fence insertion and find that the overheads
are around 4% on average on SPECint 2006, thereby indicating
the practicality of our approach. We also report the results of
a large-scale experimental study on applying oo7 to over 500
program binaries (average binary size 261 KB) from different
real-world projects.
We demonstrate that oo7 can be tuned to defend against
multiple different variants of Spectre attack (see Table I) that
exploit vulnerabilities in the victim code through specula-
tive execution. Moreover, we adapt our approach to detect
malicious program binaries that can potentially launch Melt-
down and Foreshadow attacks. We also note the limitations
of our analysis-based approach in defending against certain
variants of Spectre and Foreshadow attacks. The variants
that cannot be addressed by oo7 have potential system-level
solutions introduced by different vendors with reasonably low
overhead. The Spectre variants handled by oo7 with low
performance overhead are either not amenable to system-
level defense mechanisms, incur high performance overhead or
escape detection with existing approaches. Thus oo7 approach
via binary analysis is complementary to all the other efforts
in mitigating the impact of security vulnerabilities due to
speculative execution.
Contributions
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows. First, we present a program analysis based approach
called oo7 for mitigating Spectre attacks. Our solution is
based on binary analysis and does not involve changes to
the underlying operating system and hardware. It uses taint
analysis, address analysis and speculation modeling to check
potentially vulnerable program binaries, and inserts a small
number of fences to mitigate the risks of Spectre attack.
Our approach is accurate in identifying all the litmus tests
for Spectre vulnerabilities [1], has low performance overhead
(average 4% overhead for SPECint benchmark suite), and
is scalable as evidenced by our analysis of over 500 large
program binaries.
We show that our program analysis based approach can
detect and mitigate certain variants of Spectre vulnerabilities
in the application code, but not all (see Table I). It can also
detect malicious program binaries that can potentially launch
Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks. Thus our work provides
an understanding of the class of attacks for which an analysis
based mitigation may be suitable, and for which a system level
solution is suitable.
So far, no Spectre attacks have been found in the wild. We
have made oo7 available on request in the public domain from
https://oo7.comp.nus.edu.sg/ . We hope that the search for zero
day Spectre attacks in the wild can be substantially accelerated
via community participation using our tool.
II. SPECTRE, MELTDOWN, AND FORESHADOW VARIANTS
A number of Spectre, Meltdown, and Foreshaow vulner-
abilities that all take advantage of speculative execution in
modern processors have been disclosed recently. A summary
of these variants appear in Table I. We classify the different
vulnerabilities into three categories:
(a) Vulnerability in victim code: Many Spectre attacks rely
on vulnerable code snippets inside the victim process and
trigger speculative execution of the code snippet to read secret
data by supplying carefully selected inputs to the victim
process. We detect these vulnerabilities in oo7 by identifying
the potentially susceptible code fragments via binary analysis
and then introducing fences at selected program points to
prevent speculative execution and thereby harden the victim
software against any such attacks.
(b) BTB or RSB poisoning: In these Spectre variants, the
attacker poisons the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) or Return
Stack Buffer (RSB) in the micro-architecture. The victim
process, while using the poisoned BTB or the RSB for
speculative execution, is then mislead to branch or return to
a gadget that leaks the sensitive data. Any indirect branch or
return instruction in the victim code is vulnerable to this attack
and hence we do not attempt to mitigate these attacks in oo7.
There exist potential solutions such as Retpoline [7] or RSB
refilling [8] for these vulnerabilities.
(c) Transient out-of order execution: These attacks can
be directly launched by a malicious code (malware) without
the requirement of any specific vulnerable code fragment
or pattern in the victim process. Unlike the first class of
attacks where the defense mechanism is to harden the victim
software, here oo7 performs malware detection, i.e., it looks
for malicious code patterns within a binary.
A. Vulnerability in Victim Code
Spectre Variant 1: The following victim code fragment
exhibits Spectre vulnerability Variant 1.
void victim_function_v01(size_t x) {
if (x < array1_size) { //TB: Tainted Branch
y = array1[x]; //RS: Read Secret y
temp &= array2[y * 256]; //LS: Leak Secret y
}
}
In this example, the parameter x is under the attacker control
in the sense that x can be influenced by external input. Hence
we consider the conditional branch as a Tainted Branch (TB).
The attacker first trains the branch predictor to expect that the
branch will be true (i.e., the array bound check will pass).
The attacker then invokes the code with an input x value
outside the bound of array1. The branch predictor expects
the branch condition to be true and the CPU speculatively
reads y using malicious value x outside the array bound.
We call this action Read Secret (RS) because y can be
a potential secret that is not legitimately accessible through
malicious input without speculation. This is followed by the
CPU speculatively accessing array2 using an address that is
dependent on the secret y leading to cache state change. We
call this action Leak Secret (LS) because the change in the
cache state lingers even after the CPU realizes that the branch
prediction was wrong and squashes the speculatively executed
instructions. The attacker can now launch cache side-channel
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TABLE I: The existing speculative execution based attacks and the ability of oo7 for handling them
Classification Exploit name Public vulnerability name oo7 capability
Vulnerability in victim code
Spectre variant 1 Bounds Check Bypass (BCB) Detect and patch vulnerable victim code
Spectre variant 1.1 Bounds Check Bypass Store (BCBS) Detect and patch vulnerable victim code
Spectre variant 1.2 Read-only protection bypass (RPB) Detect and patch vulnerable victim code
Spectre-NG variant 4 Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Potentially possible but not handled yet by oo7
BTB or RSB poisoning Spectre variant 2 Branch Target Injection (BTJ) -Spectre RSB Return Mispredict -
Transient out-of-order
execution
Meltdown Rogue Data Cache Load (RDCL) Detect malicious code
ForeShadow L1 Terminal Fault-SGX Detect malicious code
Spectre-NG variant 3a Rogue System Register Read (RSRR) Detect malicious code
Spectre-NG LazyFP Lazy FP State Restore Detect malicious code
ForeShadow-NG L1 Terminal Fault-OS/ SMM -L1 Terminal Fault: VMM -
attack [4] to detect this change in cache state and discover the
secret y. Specifically, for Prime+Probe side-channel attack,
the attacker ensures that array2 was not cached before the
memory access LS by evicting the cache line through priming
the cache set. Then the attacker triggers LS action to leak the
secret to the cache side channel. Finally, the attacker performs
the probe phase to get the timing of the memory accesses for
array2 and discovers the value of y. The multiplier 256
in array2[y*256] guarantees that different values of y
lead to different cache line access, and normally, this value is
greater than or equal to the cache line size.
Spectre Variant 1.1: The idea behind the Spectre Variant
1.1, also known as Bounds Check Bypass Store (BCBS), is to
bypass bound check and execute a store instruction specula-
tively [9]. In the following example, x can potentially be under
attacker control, hence, the conditional x < array1_size
is a Tainted Branch (TB). However, unlike the Read Secret (RS)
in Spectre Variant 1, this variant uses a Speculative Write
(SW) to modify arbitrary memory location. For instance, the
example modifies an arbitrary memory location pointed by
array1[x] when the conditional branch is mispredicted for
a value x ≥ array1 size. Although this speculative store is
squashed upon resolving the branch outcome, it can leak secret
values from the program. For instance, array1[x] may
overwrite the return address and transfer control to a gadget
that leaks arbitrary secret value via a side-channel (similar to
LS in Spectre Variant 1).
void victim_function_v1.1(size_t x, y) {
if (x < array1_size) { //TB: Tainted Branch
array1[x] = y; //SW: speculative Write
}
}
Spectre Variant v1.2: This vulnerability bypasses the
protection enforced by read-only memory, e.g., code point-
ers [9]. Consider the victim_function_v1.1 where the
true valuation of the conditional captures whether x points
outside the read-only memory. If x is under attacker control,
then the write to a read-only memory can be speculatively
executed and modify crucial data structures such as code
pointers in the cache. As a result, like Spectre Variant 1.1, the
program control may transfer to arbitrary location to execute
attacker chosen code. Like Spectre Variant 1.1, this variant
also requires the presence of TB and SW.
Spectre Variant 4: Spectre Variant 4, also called Spec-
ulative Store Bypass (SSB), is based on the fact that the
processor may execute a load instruction speculatively even
when a prior store instruction in program order is pending
because the address for the store is not yet known. Thus a
speculative load may read a stale value that should have been
modified by a prior store instruction if they access the same
memory address; in that case, the speculative load should be
squashed after the store address is known.
oo7 can detect and patch victim binary code with potential
Spectre variant 1, 1.1. and 1.2 vulnerabilities. oo7 can poten-
tially handle Spectre variant 4 by identifying the vulnerable
code pattern but requires precise address analysis (that the load
and the store are accessing the same memory address) that is
not supported yet in our framework.
B. BTB or RSB poisoning
Spectre Variant 2: Most architectures support indi-
rect branches in the form of “jmp [r1]”. For such jump
instructions, the program control is diverted to a location
stored in the register r1. For improving program performance,
the processor leverage Branch Target Buffer (BTB) to store
the frequently used target locations of branch instructions,
including indirect branches. An attacker can poison the Branch
Target Buffer (BTB) to include its preferred target locations.
When the victim executes an indirect branch instruction, it
consults this poisoned BTB and the speculative execution
can potentially be misled to a target location chosen by the
attacker. Any indirect branch is vulnerable to this attack. The
indirect branches can be easily identified by static analysis and
mitigated by Retpoline [7] approach. Thus we do not consider
this variant of Spectre for our analysis based solution.
SpectreRSB: SpectreRSB vulnerability [8] is similar
to the Spectre Variant 2. Instead of poisoning the BTB
with attacker chosen location, the SpectreRSB vulnerability
manipulates the return stack buffer (RSB), which is used by
the processor to predict the return address. As a result of
a successful exploit, a function may return to an attacker
controlled location due to the mis-prediction of the return
address inflicted by an attacker. Subsequently, the program
may execute arbitrary code in the attacker-controlled location
until the return address is finally resolved. All return instruc-
tions are potentially vulnerable to such exploit. RSB refilling
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is a potential approach to mitigate SpectreRSB [8]. We do not
consider mitigating this attack in oo7.
C. Transient out-of-order execution
We now discuss the attacks that can be directly launched
from the attacker code and without the requirement of any
vulnerability in the victim code. All such attack code share
the following common features: (i) To exploit the out-of-
order execution and illegally access sensitive data (e.g., kernel
memory), and (ii) To use a covert channel, e.g., cache to leak
the sensitive data read during the first step.
Meltdown, Foreshadow, and Spectre-NG Variant 3a:
Meltdown exploits out-of-order execution to read sensitive
data, e.g., kernel memory [10]. The basic idea behind Melt-
down is shown in the following example. Reading the kernel
memory array1[x] raises an exception. However, before
the exception is handled, the processor goes ahead with the
execution (for performance reasons) and leaks the value of
array1[x] via indexing to array2. We note that the
leakage of secret is exactly the same as Leak Secret (LS) in
Spectre Variant 1.
void attack_function_v03(size_t x, y) {
//array1 points to kernel memory
y = array1[x];
//leak array1[x] via out-of-order exec and cache
temp &= array2[y*256];
}
Foreshadow [11], a more recent variant of Meltdown, ex-
ploits the out-of-order execution as described before in Intel
SGX [12]. This is to leak the sensitive data from the enclave
to the user space. Finally, the exploit Rogue System Register
Read (Spectre-NG Variant 3a) exploits out-of-order execution
to read system control registers instead of the kernel memory.
oo7 can detect all these variants.
Spectre-NG LazyFP: Lazy FPU State Leak [13] is an
exploit to illegally read a floating point register in a victim
process. In particular, many operating systems today support
lazy FPU context switching, where the FPU register states is
only restored when necessary, to reduce the context-switch
delay incurred in restoring the large floating point registers.
Specifically, the operating system tracks the owner of the
FPU. When a process that does not own the FPU accesses
it the first time, an exception is raised to restore the FPU
context for the current process. However, duo to the out-of-
order execution, the FPU instruction is still executed in the
context of the old owner before the exception is handled.
Hence, there is potential leakage of data from the security
domain of the old owner to the current process. This feature
can be exploited by the attacker to steal sensitive data from the
victim process via cache side-channel. In contrast to the basic
version of Meltdown, in this attack, the illegal access spans
over all floating point registers available in the processor. oo7
can detect this variant.
Foreshadow-NG: Foreshadow-NG [14] is an extension
of Foreshadow that exploits the L1 terminal fault to leak
sensitive data between the security domains, for example,
leakage from victim process space to the attacker process
(Foreshadow-OS), leakage from the victim VMs or the hy-
pervisor itself (Foreshadow-VMM). The attacker can use the
legal user-space virtual addresses that belong to the attacker
process; hence, it is not possible to precisely identify the illegal
memory accesses via static analysis. However, it is possible to
identify the code that leaks the sensitive data, e.g., the code
capturing cache flushes and timing a number of cache accesses
when a cache covert channel is used.
oo7 can detect malicious code with the potential to launch
Meltdown, Foreshadow, Spectre-NG Variant 3a, and Spectre-
NG LazyFP attacks.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Mitigation in the future processors
Intel has reportedly developed hardware fixes [15] in the
form of improved process and privilege-level separation for
only Spectre Variant 2. Three capabilities: Indirect Branch Re-
stricted Speculation, Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors,
Indirect Branche Predictor Barrier will be supported on the
future products to mitigate the branch target injection attack.
Vladimir et al. [16] proposed DAWG, which is a generic
mechanism to isolate the cache side-channel by partitioning
the cache ways to limit the data leakage across different
secure domains. InvisiSpec [17] is another new architecture
design to defend against Spectre-like attacks. InvisiSpec uses
a Speculative Buffer (SB) to temporarily hold the data during
speculative execution instead of directly loading the data to
the cache. The data in SB will be finally visible to the cache
hierarchy when the speculative load is safe to be committed.
InvisiSpec slows down the execution by 21%. Obviously, both
DAWG and InvisiSpec cannot be used in the legacy systems.
B. Mitigation in Legacy systems
Several approaches have been applied to mitigate Spectre
and Meltdown in legacy system. Microsoft Visual C/C++ com-
piler [18] provides a compiling option Qspectre to enable the
mitigation of Spectre Variant 1 to insert lfence serializing
instruction in the potential vulnerable code locations. However,
the mitigation technique can detect only 2 out of the 15 litmus
tests proposed by Paul Kocher [1]. Speculative Load harden-
ing [19] mitigates Spectre Variant 1 by inserting hardening
instruction sequences that zeros out the pointers that have data
dependency with the branch conditions. As it inserts hardening
instructions at all conditional branches, the technique involves
36.4% performance overhead. Oleksenko et al. [20] propose
the introduction of artificial data dependencies to protect from
Spectre attacks. This solution is coarse-grained and will effec-
tively disable speculation between any conditional branch and
subsequent load instructions. However, the authors explicitly
acknowledge the absence of precise taint tracking and leaves
it to the developer to examine whether the potential vulnerable
locations reported by the tool can be controlled by the attacker.
Microsoft has developed Windows patches [21] through CPU
microcode update for Spectre Variant 2 (but not for Variant 1).
Moreover, this update has been reported to cause performance
overhead (specially on older platforms) and system instability.
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Google Chrome has developed “Site isolation” mechanism that
sandboxes the memory pages associated with each website
to a separate process [22] at the cost of 10–13% memory
overhead. In contrast, oo7 does not require either operating
system or processor changes. Retpoline [23] has been proposed
for the gcc and LLVM compiler to mitigate Spectre version
2. Retpoline replaces vulnerable indirect branches with non-
vulnerable instruction sequence that forces the CPU to jump
to the real destination instead of the predicted target suggested
by the BTB. Recently [24] has proposed the use of symbolic
execution and SMT solving for detecting Spectre Variant 1.
This is a higher overhead and less scalable approach than ours.
Moreover, no mitigation is proposed, as we do by inserting
fence instructions.
For Meltdown mitigation, the kernel page-table isolation
patch has been enabled in the Linux kernel. This patch is
based on [25] that uses independent page tables to isolate the
kernel address from the user space. The overhead introduced
by this approach is measured to be 0.28% according to [25],
while a Linux developer measured it to be roughly 5% for
most workloads and up to 30% in some cases [26].
Compared with all existing approaches for mitigation in
the legacy system, oo7 introduces the lowest performance
overhead ( 4% on Specint 2006) as oo7 only hardens a small
number of branches in repairing Spectre-like vulnerabilities.
Moreover, oo7 is a flexible approach that can be tuned to
defend against different variants of Spectre (as shown in
this work) as well as detect malicious code fragments for
Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks.
IV. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
Our approach to identify vulnerable code fragments for
Spectre variants or malicious code fragments for Meltdown
and Foreshadow variants proceeds via static taint analysis
of program binaries. All input sources are initially marked
as tainted. Taint propagation across instructions proceed by
usual computation of forward data and control dependencies.
Thus, for data dependency based taint propagation, if any
of the operands of an instruction are tainted, the result of
the instruction is tainted. For control dependency based taint
propagation (also called as implicit flows in taint analysis
literature), the decision taken by a branch, and hence the
instructions conditionally executed owing to the decision are
tainted; the identifiers (memory/registers) written by such
tainted instructions are also treated as tainted. Details of the
formal treatment of the taint propagation policies appear in
Section V.
One of the novel aspects of our analysis is in considering
speculative execution paths while capturing taint propagation.
Conceptually this is handled by considering both possibilities
in a branch b, and checking which instructions fall inside
the speculative execution window of a branch meaning they
can be speculatively executed prior to a branch’s outcome
being known. There is no need to explicitly maintain the
speculatively executed paths as a separate set of bounded
length paths, as long as we consider both directions of a
branch in our analysis. An instruction i can be speculatively
executed pending the outcome of a branch b, only if the
distance between i and b is less than the speculative execution
window set by the processor.
To check Spectre attack scenarios such as Spectre variant 1,
we then need to look for a tainted branch instruction (TB), a
load-like instruction which reads secret (RS) with the memory
address read by RS being tainted, and RS being potentially
speculatively executed owing to TB being un-resolved. Note
that once the occurrence of TB and RS are established, the
secret data has already been speculatively accessed and can
be potentially ex-filtrated via various side channels. However,
to establish a potential Spectre variant 1 vulnerability which
is consummated via a cache side-channel attack, we need to
also establish an instruction LS to leak the secret, where the
memory address accessed by LS is dependent on the output
of RS. Once again, the detailed treatment of the condition for
checking Spectre variant is deferred to the next section.
For forward taint propagation along all possible paths, we
use the Binary analysis Platform (BAP) tool [27]. As BAP is
based on conservative analysis, it can report false positives.
Our approach for detecting Spectre style vulnerabilities is
based on BAP, while for Meltdown since we need value
set analysis for addresses we have used Angr [28]. Both
BAP and Angr leverage a set of techniques to construct the
control flow graph for a binary. As is well known in binary
analysis literature, accurate construction of control flow graph
is a notoriously difficult problem owing to indirect branches.
Tools like BAP and Angr use forced execution [29] and other
techniques to construct a control flow graph. Forced execution
(i.e., execution of both branch directions) is leveraged to
construct all possible control flow edges of a branch. As the
control flow paths are constructed, taint is propagated along
the paths as per the taint sources and taint policies set in our
approach (please see next section for details).
On false negatives: As our approach is based on the
control flow graph constructed by the underlying tools, we
cannot guarantee zero false negatives, if the control flow graph
constructed by BAP does not capture all possible flows. In
other words, the completeness of our taint analysis is modulo
the completeness of the control flow graph extraction in BAP.
Also, in BAP, loops are unrolled up to a certain depth and
might introduce a source of false negatives in BAP analysis if
the unrolling depth is low. However, with correctly provided
loop bounds, this problem can be alleviated.
On taint analysis and symbolic execution: In identifying
vulnerable code susceptible to many Spectre attack variants,
the key is to find attacker controlled branches, and mem-
ory locations that can be speculatively read/written pending
outcome of attacker controlled branches. For this reason, we
have employed static taint analysis and considered read/write
instructions that may be speculatively executed within the
speculative execution window. It is possible to take a differ-
ent, albeit higher-overhead approach e.g. instead of capturing
the taint propagation along paths, one may summarize the
execution behavior in a more fine grained fashion using
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symbolic execution, where the memory locations accessed by
a read/write is captured as symbolic expressions over (tainted)
input, instead of simply maintaining that the location accessed
by a read/write is tainted. This leads to additional overhead
of constraint accumulation and solving. In this way, higher
overhead detection approaches can be constructed such as
the recent work of [24] that appeared in the public domain
six months after our work, and handles Spectre variant 1.
[24] only reports results for different variants of the Spectre
litmus tests with few lines of code. As is shown by our
experiments, even a low overhead approach like ours consumes
high analysis times on a few real-life programs from SPECint
and OSS-Fuzz. Hence we feel higher overhead approaches are
not scalable enough for possible real-life usage. Furthermore,
for any Spectre attack detection approach, it is not enough
to detect leaks, the analysis needs to suggest a small number
of fences to plug the leak. This is done in our approach. On
the other hand, symbolic approaches like [24] simply detect
leaks without suggesting concrete fence instructions to harden
Spectre vulnerable code.
V. SPECTRE VULNERABILITY DETECTION
To describe our analysis, we use the notations in Table II.
We say that an instruction is tainted, i.e., τ(inst) is true, if
and only if the instruction operates on some tainted operands.
We will first discuss the checker for Spectre Variant 1.
A. Detecting Spectre Variant 1
An important concept that we need for our analysis is the
Speculative Execution Window, abbreviated SEW . We posit
that information about SEW needs to be exposed by processor
designers for the sake of detecting Spectre attacks. By default,
it seems that SEW can be set to the size of the re-order
buffer in an out-of-order processor. However, if the size of the
re-order buffer is n, it is not sufficient to have a lookahead
of n instructions from a tainted conditional branch TB, in
our search for memory access RS, in order to detect Spectre
attacks. For processor execution, each instruction is decode to
a sequence of micro-ops. Each micro-op will occupy one slot
of the re-order buffer during execution. However, micro-ops
can be fused [30] both within an instruction as well as across
instruction. When micro-ops are fused across instructions (also
called macro-fusion), the micro-ops of at most two instructions
can be fused into a single micro-op. For this reason, if the
size of the re-order buffer is n, we conservatively set the
Speculative Execution Window to 2n in our analysis, so as
to avoid any false negatives in our analysis.
Φspectre ≡ br(TB) ∧ load(RS) ∧mem(LS)∧
τ(TB) ∧ τ(addr(RS)) ∧ τ(addr(LS))∧
Dep(RS , addr(LS)) ∧ (∆(TB,RS) ≤ SEW ) ∧ (∆(TB,LS) ≤ SEW )
(1)
We now elaborate the checking condition for detecting
Spectre. oo7 locates TB , RS and LS by checking Φspectre.
Intuitively, the first two lines of Φspectre capture the presence
TABLE II: Symbols used in describing oo7
Symbol Interpretation
br(inst) inst is a branch instruction
time(inst) inst is an timing instruction, e.g.,
rdtsc
mem(inst) inst is a memory access instruction
load(inst) inst is a load instruction
addr(inst) the data memory address accessed by
a memory-related instruction inst
reg(inst) set of registers accessed by instruction
inst
set(addr) cache set accessed by memory address
addr
τ(inst) instruction inst is tainted
τ(x) instruction operand x is tainted where
x could be a register, memory location
or the value located in a memory loca-
tion
∆(inst1, inst2) minimum no. of instructions exe-
cuted to reach inst2 from inst1. If
inst2 is unreachable from inst1, then
∆(inst1, inst2) =∞.
Dep(inst, x) x is data-dependent on instruction inst
CDep(inst) set of instructions control-dependent on
inst
val(x) value located at memory address x
SEW Speculative Execution Window = 2n,
where n is the size of re-order buffer
in the processor
of tainted branch instructions TB and tainted memory-access
instructions RS and LS . The last line shows that RS and LS
are located within the speculation window of TB , and they
are data-dependent. Φspectre reflects Spectre variant 1. Later
we show that Φspectre can easily be changed to detect other
Spectre variants e.g. variant 1.1.
B. Taint Analysis
We use taint analysis [27] to determine whether conditional
branch instructions (e.g. TB ) and the memory-access instruc-
tions (e.g. RS and LS ) can be controlled via untrusted inputs.
In the following, we outline the taint propagation policies
and rules used to detect Spectre vulnerabilities. To illustrate
our taint propagation policy, we use the following kinds of
instructions.
• z = x op y : Binary operation on register x and register
y. The operation op can be either arithmetic operation
(e.g. addition or subtraction) or a logical operation (e.g.
a logical comparison).
• y = op x : Unary operation on register x. The operation
op can either be arithmetic (e.g. unary minus) or a logical
one (e.g. logical negation).
• y = load(x) : Loads value from memory address x to
register y.
• y = store(x) : Stores value from register x to memory
address y.
• branch(L, x) : Branch to label L if the logical formula
x is true.
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Taint Propagation Policies:: Initially, all variables that read
value from un-trusted sources (e.g., files, network) are tainted.
The taint from these variables is then propagated via a well-
defined set of rules shown in the following; for each rule,
the premises appear on the top of the horizontal bar and the
conclusions appear below the horizontal bar. Our taint propa-
gation tracks both data dependencies and control dependencies
(also known as implicit flows in taint analysis). Typically such
implicit flows come in the form of the tainted data enabling or
disabling a branch condition b, and the outcome of b affecting
the computation of a variable which would not be tainted
otherwise purely by tracking of data dependencies.
Taint Propagation Rules
z = x op y τ(x) ∨ τ(y)
[Binary operation]
τ(z) ∧ τ(inst)
y = op x τ(x)
[Unary operation]
τ(y) ∧ τ(inst)
y = load(x) τ (val(x))
[Memory load]
τ(y) ∧ τ(inst)
y = load(x) τ(x)
[Memory load]
τ(y) ∧ τ(inst)
y = store(x) τ(x)
[Memory store]
τ (val(y)) ∧ τ(inst)
br(inst) τ(x)
[branch(L, x)]
τ(inst)
τ(x) Tinst = CDep(inst)
[branch(L, x)] ∀t ∈ Tinst . τ(t) ∧ ∀w ∈Write(Tinst). τ(w)
Taint Propagation Rules:: Based on the discussions in the
preceding paragraphs, the taint propagation rules are shown.
In the taint propagation rules, we assume that inst captures
the current instruction for which the taint propagation is being
computed. Write(Tinst) captures the set of operands written
by a set of instructions Tinst . We observe how τ(x) is
computed for an operand x, where x could be a register, mem-
ory location or the value located in a memory location. The
last propagation rule captures control dependence based taint
tracking. Our taint propagation rules take care to avoid any
under-tainting, by considering the forward transitive closure
of all control and data dependencies from the taint sources.
C. Detecting other Spectre variants
In the preceding section, we discussed the detection of
Spectre variant 1 [2]. Note that Spectre variant 1 can leak the
secret data in other ways instead of performing exactly LS
action. Such variants can be detected via simple manipulation
of Φspectre:
Φ
weak
spectre ≡ br(TB) ∧ load(RS) ∧ τ(TB) ∧ τ(addr(RS))∧
(∆(TB,RS) ≤ SEW )
(2)
Our oo7 approach can be fine tuned to detect a variety of
other Spectre variants. For instance, consider Spectre Variant
1.1 (cf. Table I). Such a variant can easily be detected by the
following condition:
Φ
v1.1
spectre ≡ br(TB) ∧ store(SW ) ∧ τ(TB) ∧ τ(addr(SW ))∧
(∆(TB,SW ) ≤ SEW )
(3)
where store(SW ) captures the presence of a speculative
write instruction, as needed to exploit Spectre Variant 1.1.
Spectre Variant 1.2 (read-only protection bypass) needs exactly
the same condition Φv1.1spectre to be satisfied, except that the
speculative write (SW ) happens to be in read-only memory.
For the rest of the paper, we do not distinguish between
Spectre Variant 1.1 and 1.2, as oo7 uses the same condition
to detect both the variants.
To detect Spectre Variant 4, we need to check whether a load
instruction (RS ) follows a store (WR) to the same address,
yet RS can speculatively load a value not yet written by WR.
Checking for this condition requires accurate address analysis,
more accurate than what we can currently support. We are
currently working in this direction.
D. Code repair
Our repair strategy is based on systematically inserting
memory fences after each tainted branch (i.e., TB ) in vul-
nerable code fragments for Spectre variants 1, 1.1 and 1.2.
The original article describing Spectre attacks [2] suggests
insertion of memory fences following each conditional branch.
However, using our analysis, we can obtain the exact sequence
〈TB ,RS ,LS 〉 (for Variant 1) or the sequence 〈TB ,SW 〉 (for
Variant 1.1 and Variant 1.2) vulnerable to Spectre attacks. As
a result, we can accurately locate the program point where
the memory fence should be inserted. In particular, we insert
memory fences following TB instruction and immediately
before the execution of RS and SW , respectively, for Spectre
Variant 1 and Variant 1.1, 1.2. This prevents execution from
loading the secret value into the cache (for Variant 1) and
writing to an attacker-controlled location (for Variant 1.1, 1.2)
speculatively.
Nevertheless, inserting memory fences may affect the over-
all program performance. oo7 inserts memory fences only for
the branches identified as TB (for variants 1, 1.1 and 1.2). This
has less overheads than inserting fences after each conditional
branch, or after each tainted conditional branch. We show
empirically that such a strategy has acceptable performance
overheads of average 4% for SPECint benchmarks.
VI. EVALUATION SETUP
A. Architecture of the tool
Figure 1 provides an overview of oo7 tool. oo7 contains two
main modules: a vulnerability detection module for detecting
the Spectre vulnerabilities, and a code repair module to fix the
Spectre vulnerabilities.
We adopt BAP [27] as our primary taint analysis platform
(cf. Section V-B). BAP provides a toolkit for implementing
automated binary analysis and it supports multiple architec-
tures such as x86, x86-64, ARM, PowerPC, and MIPS. In our
oo7 framework, BAP first takes a binary program and the taint
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Fig. 1: Overview of oo7 framework. The components in gray are added by oo7.
sources as inputs. A taint source is an API that imports the
data from an un-trusted channel such as network, user input
or file reader interface. We consider all user inputs (e.g., via
console, file and network) as tainted.
Vulnerability detection module:: The detailed architec-
ture of the vulnerability detection module (cf. Section V) is
outlined in Figure 1. BAP disassembles and lifts binary code
into the RISC-like intermediate representation (IR) named as
BAP Instruction Language (BIL). Program analysis is per-
formed using the BIL representation and it is architecture in-
dependent. BAP contains a microexecution framework named
Primus to interpret a lifted program, a low-level intermediate
representation of code created by BAP by lifting the binary.
The core component of Primus is the interpreter. It emulates
the execution of a program by using the underlying technology
of forced execution [29].
BAP provides several interfaces to export crucial informa-
tion to other analysis modules during the interpretation. Such
interfaces use a publish/subscribe architecture to watch the
interpreter events. The subscribers are allowed to listen to
arbitrary changes in the interpreter state (i.e., Global states).
During the analysis, BAP wakes up the specific subscriber
when analyzing the events registered by the subscriber. For
example, the taint engine module is invoked by the interpreter
when it completes the interpretation of an instruction (post-
execution event). When the subscriber of the taint engine is
invoked, it checks the taint data from the taint source and
propagates it if the instruction satisfies the taint policy (cf.
Section V-B). The Spectre detector module is invoked by BAP
interpreter after a branch is executed to check whether it is
tainted and whether it is followed by possible speculative
load/store instructions as per the Spectre variants. Spectre
detector checks the state of the interpreted instruction in
the light of satisfying the condition Φspectre explained in
Equation 1.
Vulnerability repair module:: Once a vulnerable code
fragment is detected in the binary, we locate the corresponding
assembly code for repair. To this end, we first mark the
address(es) of Spectre vulnerable code, as obtained during the
detection stage of oo7. Concurrently, we obtained the disas-
sembled code from the binary and the assembly code from the
source (via “-S” option in gcc compiler). Since most compiler
optimizations are employed during the compiling stage, there
does not exist substantial difference between the assembly
code and the respective disassembled code. This allows us to
easily map the disassembled code back to the assembly code
and locate the instructions vulnerable to Spectre.
Finally, our repair module directly modifies the assembly
code by inserting memory fence instructions in the appropriate
location (e.g inserting lfence before RS for mitigating
Spectre Variant 1).
B. Subject Programs
We conduct evaluation on three sets of subject programs.
• We first apply oo7 on 15 code examples purpose-built to
demonstrate different variations of Spectre vulnerabilities
from Paul Kocher’s blog post [1]. We call these Litmus
Tests.
• Next, we conduct evaluation on SPECint2006 bench-
marks, which have been well-studied by the computer
architecture community. These are detailed in Table III.
We concentrate on complete analysis of the SPECint (in-
teger) benchmark suite because it includes more control-
intensive code compared to SPECfp (floating point)
and Spectre exploits vulnerability through conditional
branches. Specint benchmark suite contains 18.31%
branches in the instruction mix compared to only 5.75%
for SPECfp [31].
• Last but not the least, we conduct evaluation with a
large number of software projects from Google OSS-Fuzz
repository [32] and GitHub. The program binaries in these
project include the main application and miscellaneous
support tools. Table IV summarizes the characteristics of
these projects consisting of a total of 509 program bina-
ries with size ranging from 8.5KB to 21.8MB (average
size 261.4KB).
C. Evaluation Platform
We conduct experimental evaluation on Intel Xeon Gold
6126 [33] running at 2.6GHz with 192GB memory. The un-
derlying micro-architecture is Skylake with 224-entry reorder
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buffer (ROB) [34]. Due to the potential micro-operation fusion
in x86 micro-architectures (Section V), we conservatively set
the speculative window to twice the effective ROB size, i.e.,
SEW = 448. Intel Xeon Gold 6126 is equipped with 12 cores
and 19.25MB non-inclusive shared last-level cache (LLC) with
64 byte line size. The LLC cache miss penalty is about 200
cycles. Non-inclusive LLC is more secure than the inclusive
cache and can thwart certain LLC based side-channel attacks
(e.g, Flush+Flush, Prime+Probe). However, it is still
vulnerable to the Flush+Reload attack. Thus the Spectre
and Meltdown attacks can be potentially carried out in this
platform.
VII. EVALUATION RESULTS
Our evaluation investigates three different aspects:
1) Effectiveness How effective is oo7 in detecting Spectre
vulnerabilities in program binaries?
2) Analysis Time How long is the oo7 analysis time to
detect Spectre vulnerabilities?
3) Performance Overhead How much is the performance
overhead introduced by oo7 to protect vulnerable code
fragments?
A. Evaluation with Litmus Tests
oo7 can correctly identify all code snippets purpose-built
with different variations of Spectre vulnerabilities [1] as po-
tential victim code fragments. 14 code examples are identified
with taint propagation only along data dependencies. The
remaining code example is detected with taint propagation
along program (both control and data) dependencies.
The latest Microsoft Visual C++ compiler [6] has inte-
grated /Qspectre switch for mitigating a limited set of
potentially vulnerable code patterns related to the Spectre
vulnerabilities. Specifically, after compiling an application
with /Qspectre enabled, the Visual C++ compiler attempts
to insert an lfence instruction upon detecting Spectre code
patterns. Paul Kocher [1] has evaluated the Microsoft compiler
using the 15 litmus tests. The blog post [1] mentions that only
two of the micro-benchmarks are identified and protected by
the Visual C++ compiler. In contrast, oo7 can correctly detect
all the 15 code examples as potential victims.
The example (v13 [1]) that requires taint propagation along
both control and data dependencies is given below.
__inline int is_x_safe(size_t x) {
if (x < array1_size) return 1; else return 0;
}
void victim_function_v13(size_t x) {
if (is_x_safe(x)) temp &= array2[array1[x]*512];
}
The branch in the victim function
victim_function_v13 is tainted as the return value
of is_x_safe(x) is controlled via untrusted input x.
However, the return value of is_x_safe(x) is control-
dependent and not data-dependent on x. Thus oo7 can detect
this code pattern as potential vulnerability only if both data-
and control-dependent taint propagation are applied.
We design an attacker process to steal secrets via cache side-
channel from the victim process (litmus test example) once the
secret data is brought into the cache through Spectre attack.
We manage to successfully extract data from arbitrary memory
locations in the victim process on our platform. We then allow
oo7 to automatically insert lfence instructions at appropriate
program locations to prevent speculation in vulnerable code
fragments. We verify that the attacker process can no longer
extract data from the victim processes running with the oo7
fix.
B. Results on SPECint benchmarks
We use SPECint 2006 CPU benchmark suite [35] to quan-
tify the performance overhead of oo7 protection mechanism,
as well as for evaluating the efficacy of our detection and
repair. SPECint 2006 benchmark suite contains 12 programs
in C and C++. Table III outlines the salient features of these
program: the binary size, analysis and repair time, the number
of conditional branches, the number of tainted branches TB ,
the number of 〈TB ,RS 〉 pairs as well as the number of
〈TB ,SW 〉 pairs.
We note that seven out of twelve programs exhibit the vul-
nerability pattern of Spectre variant 1 as evidenced by the pres-
ence of 〈TB,RS〉 pattern (perlbench, bzip2, gcc,
hmmer, sjeng, omnetpp, xalancbmk). By looking
for the 〈TB,RS〉 pattern, we conservatively assume the
strictest security requirement of reading secret data. The
subsequent mechanism to leak the secret data can vary with the
most common mechanism being the cache side-channel with
〈TB,RS,LS〉 code pattern. Four of them (perlbench,
bzip2, omnetpp, xalancbmk) are vulnerable with
Spectre variant 1.1, 1.2 as evidenced by the presence of
〈TB, SW 〉 pattern. The analysis time varies from 58 seconds
(specrand) to 142 hours (h264ref). The analysis time not
only depends on the binary size but also the complexity of
the program logic, more specifically, the number of branches.
Our repair works on the assembly code and can complete in
15 seconds for these benchmarks.
We evaluate the runtime overhead due to fence insertion
by executing each modified program ten times and report the
average values. Figure 2 shows the normalized execution time.
The average performance overhead is 442.2% when fences
are inserted naively at both destinations of all conditional
branches. This is the safest strategy in the absence of an
accurate program analyzers such as oo7. In contrast, oo7
only inserts fences at detected conditional branches covering
Spectre Variants 1, 1.1, 1.2 and oo7 incurs only 4.46%
overhead on an average.
C. Evaluation on various software projects
We observe that the detection of Spectre Variant 1 takes the
longest time from our experiments with SPECint benchmarks.
So we apply oo7 on 509 binaries (Table IV) to detect potential
Spectre variant 1 code snippets to evaluate the scalability
of our analysis. The column ”# of vulnerable programs” in
Table IV shows the number of program binaries in each
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TABLE III: Results for the detection of Spectre vulnerable code fragments in SPECint2006. #〈TB〉 denotes the tainted
conditional branches detected by oo7. 〈TB,RS〉 satisfies Spectre Variant 1 condition, while 〈TB, SW 〉 satisfies Spectre
Variant 1.1, 1.2 conditions as detected by oo7.
Program Binary Size Analysistime(h—s)
Repair
time (s)
#Conditional
branches # 〈TB〉 # 〈TB,RS〉 #〈TB, SW 〉
perlbench 1.2MB 125h 5 21972 60 18 5
bzip2 69 KB 0.45h 1 942 102 81 5
gcc 3.6MB 134h 11 59614 15 0 0
mcf 23 KB 58s 1 202 1 0 0
gobmk 3.9 MB 0.86h 1 11549 35 0 0
hmmer 319KB 2.49h 1 4468 31 13 0
sjeng 153 KB 1.9h 1 2146 14 3 0
libquantum 51KB 1.3h 1 444 30 0 0
h264ref 577 KB 22h 1 6743 5 0 0
omnetpp 768KB 20.6h 2 4812 48 26 3
astar 52 KB 864s 1 541 0 0 0
xalancbmk 5.8MB 142h 15 62209 9 4 2
project with potential vulnerabilities. We identify a program
as vulnerable if it has at least one 〈TB,RS〉 pattern in the
code that can potentially be exploited by the attacker to read
secret data, i.e., we conservatively assume the strictest security
requirement. As mentioned earlier, the subsequent mechanism
to leak the secret data can vary with the most common mech-
anism being the cache side-channel with 〈TB,RS,LS〉 code
pattern. For each project, we report the number of vulnerable
programs under two different taint propagation strategies: data
dependencies and program (data & control) dependencies. For
example, in project samba, out of total 230 programs, oo7
detects 50 and 83 binaries as potential victims under program-
and data-dependence taint propagations. Program-dependence
based taint propagation identifies additional vulnerable code
fragments compared to data-dependence only. Altogether, 180
(or 261) out of 509 programs are labeled as potential victims
by oo7 under data- (or program-) dependence taint propa-
gation. Table IV also show the analysis time in hours for
detecting 〈TB,RS〉 patterns using data dependencies, and
program dependencies.
Potential Spectre Vulnerability in Large-scale Code:
We show only one example of a Spectre vulnerability un-
earthed by oo7 in Figure 3. This code snippet is identified
static int command_lcp(...,char **argv,...) 
{ 
 keylen2 = atoi(argv[3]); 
 if ((keylen2 < 0) ||         /* TB */ 
       (keylen2 > (int) BITSOF(strlen(argv[2])))) { 
     ... 
     return -1; 
  } 
  … 
  lcp = fr_trie_path_lcp(…,keylen2,…); 
} 
static int fr_trie_path_lcp(…, int keylen2, …) 
{ 
... 
  if (end_bit > keylen2) end_bit = keylen2;  
  ... 
  e2 = end_bit; 
  ... 
  xor <<= s2; 
  xor |= lcp_end_bit[e2 - s2]; /* RS */ 
  lcp = xor2lcp[xor];          /* LS */ 
  ... 
} 
Fig. 3: Potential Spectre vulnerability in trie.c within
project freeradius. argv is tainted from a taint source gets().
The triplet 〈TB ,RS ,LS 〉 is highlighted.
by oo7 in a program (src/lib/util/trie.c) within the
project freeradius. Note that oo7 identifies the vulnerabil-
ity at binary level. For the sake of exposition and brevity,
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TABLE IV: Software Projects used from Github and OSS-Fuzz and the detected Spectre v1 Vulnerabilities. DD=Data-
dependence, PD=Program-dependence (data & control dependence).
Project Project Description # of Programs Avg. Binary size # of Vulnerable programs Avg. analysis time (h)DD PD DD PD
samba SMB/CIFS networking protocol 230 124.0KB 50 83 0.24 0.68
coreutils GNU OS file, shell and text manipulation utilities 114 125.3KB 71 81 0.32 0.92
cups Common UNIX Printing System 52 134.3KB 29 46 0.18 0.29
freeradius Popular open-source RADIUS server 47 49.9KB 10 24 0.19 0.42
openldap Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 31 1.3MB 10 12 3.6 5.2
openssh Network utilities based on SSH protocol 11 791.9KB 3 6 2.5 4.7
xrdp Remote desktop protocol (rdp) server 10 107.3KB 0 0 0.14 0.62
ppp PPP daemon and associated utilities 4 322.0KB 1 2 0.68 1.3
dropbear Small SSH server and client 4 1.2MB 2 2 5.6 13.2
botan A cryptography library 2 13.9MB 0 1 28 74
netdata Distributed real-time performance monitoring 2 1.9MB 2 2 4.3 7.9
wget Content retrieval from web servers 1 937.2KB 1 1 2.8 4.5
darknet Convolutional Neural Networks 1 663.9KB 1 1 2.2 6.5
Total - 509 - 180 261 - -
we show only the portions corresponding to the Spectre
vulnerability pattern at source code level. As comments,
we highlight the code fragments detected as TB , RS and
LS . The argument argv is a tainted array read from an
external file through the taint source gets(). The con-
ditional check in the function command_lcp is therefore
a tainted branch (TB ). Taint is propagated to the function
fr_trie_path_lcp via the parameter keylen2. Conse-
quently, the array load lcp_end_bit may use the value of
e2 (potentially controlled by the attacker through argv[3])
during speculative execution. This speculative execution may
take place due to the misprediction of the conditional branch
in command_lcp that reflects a bound check. Finally, the
array access xor2lcp may reveal information out of the
boundary of array lcp_end_bit[] via cache side channel.
Though the pattern 〈TB,RS,LS〉 is found in the wild by
oo7, the vulnerable code fragment is executed only once at
run-time, making it impossible for the adversary to poison
the branch and launch an attack. The distance between TB
and RS is 145 x86 instructions. The example illustrates that
Spectre vulnerability in real-world may span over multiple
functions requiring inter-procedural program analysis.
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Fig. 4: Cumulative distribution of distance (#instructions)
between TB and RS for binaries in Table IV under data- and
program dependence based taint propagation.
Sensitivity to Speculative Execution Window size: We
set the speculative execution window size SEW = 448
as twice the effective ROB size in our platform. This is
a conservative assumption to take care of micro-operation
fusion. We investigate the sensitivity of our analysis on SEW
value. Figure 4 shows the distance in instructions between TB
and RS (∆(TB,RS)) for vulnerable code fragments across all
509 binaries. The results show that 83% and 79% of the tainted
memory accesses (RS) occur within 100 instructions from the
tainted branch (TB) for data-and program-dependence based
taint propagation, respectively.
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Fig. 5: Cumulative distribution of analysis time for binaries
in Table IV under data- and program dependence based taint
propagation.
Analysis and Repair Time of oo7: The analysis time
depends on the size and complexity of the binary. Figure 5
shows the distribution of analysis time across all the binaries.
Under data-dependence based taint propagation, the analysis
time is less than 20 minutes for 78% of the binaries. Program-
dependence based taint propagation increases the analysis
time; still the analysis completes within 20 minutes for 55%
of the binaries. The repair time is minimal; for all of the 509
binaries, it is within 30 seconds.
Quantitative Analysis of Vulnerabilities: Our analysis
shows that on an average only 7.3% (variance 0.3%) of
conditional branches are tainted across 238 programs with at
least one tainted branch. Moreover, 271 out of 509 binaries
do not have any tainted branch at all. Next we check the
percentage of conditional branches in that program binary that
are tainted (TB) and are followed by tainted memory access
11
(RS) within speculative execution window. If we want to
ensure strict security requirements, then lfence instruction
should be inserted after all these tainted branches. On an
average, our analysis shows only 3.5% (variance 0.3%) of
conditional branches satisfy this criteria leading to very low
overhead in fixing Spectre vulnerability. Finally, we check the
percentage of conditional branches in that program binary that
are tainted (TB) and are followed by tainted memory access
(RS) within speculative execution window and a subsequent
tainted memory access (LS) to leak the data to the cache. This
is denoted as TB+RS+LS. If we assume cache side-channel
attack as the only mechanism to leak the secret brought into
the cache, then oo7 only needs to add lfence instruction
after these branches. On an average, only 2.3% of conditional
branches (variance 0.1%) satisfy this criteria. This strongly
indicates that the performance overhead from inserting fences
suggested by our technique will be low. However we could
not collect the exact performance overhead for all of these 509
binaries since it will involve running each binary against many
inputs and averaging the performance overhead across inputs.
Furthermore, for some of the binaries such as coreutils, a
large set of inputs (each input being a command) is possible.
For this reason, we computed performance overheads on
SPEC2006 benchmarks instead, which are standard benchmark
suite with inputs specified for performance analysis.
VIII. MELTDOWN-STYLE MALWARE DETECTION
Meltdown-like malware revolves around the idea of ac-
cessing unauthorized memory via out-of-order or speculative
execution. Subsequently, the value from this memory read is
leaked via a covert channel, such as cache. Therefore, the
crux of detecting such malware is to discover the existence of
an instruction sequence that may perform the aforementioned
actions. There exists a variety of covert channels via which
a value can be leaked. Cache is a low noise channel and a
substantial number of cache side-channel attacks are capable
to leak sensitive data. For the sake of simplicity, our following
discussion is based on Prime+Probe, one of the most
effective and practical cache timing attack. But it can easily be
modified to capture other type of cache side-channel attacks
such as Flush+Reload [4].
A. Detection Method
Detecting reads from unauthorized memory address or
registers: Let us assume Xsup captures the set of memory
locations or registers that a user process is unauthorized to
access. For Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks (cf. Table I),
Xsup spans over the kernel memory and the enclave mem-
ory, respectively. For RSRR (Rogue System Register Read)
and LazyFP (cf. Table I), Xsup captures the set of system
registers and floating point registers, respectively. To identify
the reading of an unauthorized memory location (Meltdown
and Foreshadow attacks (cf. Table I)), we check for an
unauthorized memory access (UA) and an instruction to leak
the secret (LS ) accessed by UA within the speculation window
SEW . The presence of such a pair of instructions 〈UA,LS 〉
can be formalized via the following condition Φsecret:
Φsecret (UA,LS) ≡ (addr(UA) ∪ reg(UA)) ∩Xsup 6= φ
∧mem(LS) ∧Dep(UA, addr(LS))
∧∆(UA,LS) ≤ SEW
(4)
In Equation 4, statically computing addr(UA) involves value
analysis [36]. Finally, for Foreshadow-NG [14] attack, the
condition addr(UA)∩Xsup 6= φ always holds, as Xsup might
point to any virtual address, yet trick the virtual memory man-
ager (VMM) to launch an unauthorized access to a physical
memory page. Thus, oo7 does not attempt to identify malware
containing potential Foreshadow-NG attack [14].
Identifying Prime+Probe cache attack: The basic idea
behind Prime+Probe cache attack is to first load a set
of cache sets (prime phase) with attacker controlled data
before launching the unauthorized memory/register access, as
discussed in the preceding paragraph. After the unauthorized
access, the attacker times the access to cache sets loaded in the
prime phase to determine the secret located in the unauthorized
memory/register location.
Let us assume that the set of cache sets primed and probed
are Sprime and Sprobe, respectively. Clearly, for a successful
Prime+Probe cache attack, Sprime ∩ Sprobe 6= φ. Consider
one such cache set si ∈ Sprime ∩ Sprobe. We need to check
whether cache set si is subjected to Prime+Probe. An
instruction sequence Ipri primes a full cache set si if they
fill up all the ways of cache set si. This is formalized via the
following condition:
Φsiprime (Ipri) ≡ iSeq(Ipri) ∧
∧
inst∈Ipri
mem(inst)
∧
∧
inst∈Ipri
(set(addr(inst)) = si) ∧
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
inst∈Ipri
addr(inst)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ω
(5)
where ω captures the size of a full cache set si and the
predicate iSeq is evaluated true if and only if the sequence of
instructions, as provided via its argument, appear along any
valid control flow path.
Probing a cache set requires finding the time to access the
cache set. Thus, each probe to cache set si can be captured
via a sequence 〈ts, inst, te〉 where ts is an instruction to log
the time before the probe, inst is the access to probed cache
set si and te is an instruction to log the time after the probe.
An instruction sequence Ipro probes a full cache set si if Ipro
involves a sequence of triplets of the form 〈ts, inst, te〉 that
also fill up all the ways of si. Thus, probing cache set si is
captured via the following condition:
Φsiprobe (Ipro) ≡ iSeq(Ipro)
∧
∧
〈ts,inst,te〉∈Ipro
(time(ts) ∧mem(inst) ∧ time(te))
∧
∧
〈ts,inst,te〉∈Ipro
(set(addr(inst)) = si)
∧ |{addr(inst) | 〈ts, inst, te〉 ∈ Ipro}| = ω
(6)
To capture the timing of an access, an attacker can use either
rdtsc instruction or OS-provided standard APIs.
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Detecting the malware: We detect malware containing
potential Meltdown or Foreshadow attacks when our analysis
identifies an instruction sequence that involves priming a cache
set si, launching an unauthorized access and probing the
cache set si. Consider such an instruction sequence Imal.
Thus, Imal will contain a subsequence Ipri satisfying Φsiprime,
followed by a subsequence Isec satisfying Φsecret(UA,LS )
and terminating in a subsequence Ipro satisfying Φsipro. This
is formally categorized as follows:
Φsimalware ≡ ∃Imal. iSeq(Imal)
∧ ∃Ipri, Isec, Ipro. (Imal = Ipri  Isec  Ipro)
∧ Φsiprime(Ipri) ∧ (∃ UA,LS ∈ Isec. Φsecret (UA,LS))
∧ Φsiprobe(Ipro)
(7)
where  is an ordered composition of instruction sequences.
As si is an arbitrary cache set in Equation 7, it is a general
solution to detect the presence of Prime+Probe via any
(set of) cache sets. In general, checking Φsimalware involves
value analysis, program dependency analysis and reachability
analysis using the program CFG. Finally, although Φsimalware
is demonstrated for Prime+Probe attack here, it can easily
be modified to capture other type of cache side-channel attacks
such as Flush+Reload [4].
B. Implementation
We have designed the malware detection module on top
of the Angr [28] tool. Specifically, we leverage the value set
analysis capability of Angr to detect malicious code fragments,
as captured via the condition Φsimalware (cf. Equation 7).
A crucial step in the Meltdown-style malware is to leak
sensitive data through a covert cache side-channel. Recent
work, such as SCADET [37] detects Prime+Probe attack.
Unlike SCADET, our detection does not only concern the
Prime and Probe phase, but also the illegal memory or register
accesses.
C. Meltdown Evaluation results
Our implementation can detect the Proof-of-Concept code
of Meltdown [38] (using Flush+Reload attack) and a
Prime+Probe version of Meltdown modified by us based
on the Proof-of-Concept code [38]. We use the same set of
programs from the SPECint2006 CPU benchmark suite [35]
for evaluating the analysis time of Meltdown-like malware.
The result is listed in Table V. Our detection algorithm takes
around 578 seconds on average for the SPEC benchmarks.
IX. LIMITATIONS OF OUR APPROACH
oo7 demonstrates the possibility of low-overhead Spectre
mitigation by judiciously inserting fences while still ensuring
safety. Still, oo7 has its limitations.
oo7 relies on BAP, which, in turn incorporates a taint
analysis engine. The taint analysis statically interprets the code
by unrolling the loops up to a certain depth. In order to ensure
that our approach does not introduce false negatives we need
to pay attention to the following three issues.
• Optimistic loop unrolling may introduce false negatives
(missing vulnerabilities) in oo7. However, with correct or
worst-case loop bounds supplied to BAP, such a limitation
can be mitigated.
• Secondly, taint sources are provided to the taint analysis
engine, and if taint sources are under-specified then the
taint analysis may not identify all the branches that can be
controlled by the attacker. We conservatively assume all
user inputs via console, file, and network as taint sources
to avoid this problem.
• Finally, the completeness of the control-flow extraction
also plays a role to decide whether our analysis will
introduce false negatives. If the branch targets of register
indirect jumps are not identified, the control flow graph
extracted from the binary will not be complete, and as a
result the taint analysis results may miss tainted branches.
Thus, our approach always depends on the control flow
graph being as complete as possible, in trying to ensure
that we do not have false negatives in our analysis.
oo7 finds tainted memory accesses following a tainted con-
ditional branch within a fixed speculation window. Incorrect
setting of this speculation window size may lead to false
positives (window size too big) or false negatives (window
size too small). We conservatively set the window length to
twice the size of the of the reorder buffer, as explained earlier.
oo7 works on native code for program binaries. We have
not investigated Spectre detection on interpreted code.
The capability of taint analysis gives oo7 the flexibility
to adapt to various Spectre variants in addition to detecting
malware with potential Meltdown or Foreshadow attacks. We
have discussed in detail (Section II) the class of Spectre,
Meltdown, Foreshadow variants that we can handle and the
ones that cannot be handled. In addition, new variants are
constantly being found, we could face some variants in future
that oo7 cannot be adapted to handle.
X. DISCUSSION
We have built oo7 for detecting Spectre vulnerabilities in
binary code and protecting against the attack with minimal
overhead. Our approach is employed post-compilation on
native code to take into account all the compiler optimizations.
No change to the operating system or the processor is needed
as the approach proceeds by program analysis. We demonstrate
that systematic analysis is useful both for detecting Spectre
vulnerabilities and to repair them with minimal performance
overhead. Our work shows the importance of exposing selected
micro-architectural information for enhanced application secu-
rity, and can help strengthen the dialogue between architecture
and program analysis communities. Our work also provides
an understanding of the class of Spectre attacks for which
an analysis based mitigation may be suitable, and for which
classes of attacks a system level solution is suitable.
For detecting Spectre vulnerabilities in the wild and promote
further research in the area, we have made our Spectre
vulnerability detection code accessible via the following web-
site https://oo7.comp.nus.edu.sg/
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TABLE V: The analysis time of Meltdown-style malware detection on SPECint2006
Program perlbench bzip2 gcc mcf gobmk hmmer sjeng libquantum h264ref omnetpp astar xalancbmk Avg.
Analysis time (s) 3193 45 1672 12 628 212 205 49 448 17 30 424 578
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